

REFORMING THE MILITARY

MILITARY REFORM:
A WINNING MILITARY AT
AN AFFORDABLE PRICE

THERE ARE TWO FUNDAMENTAL REASONS FOR THIS BRIEFING:

FIRST, WE ARE WORRIED THAT OUR MILITARY CAN NO LONGER WIN.

SECOND, WE HAVE DOUBTS AS TO WHETHER THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WILL CONTINUE
TO SUPPORT HIGH AND INCREASING BUDGETS FOR A NON-WINNING MILITARY.

BRIEFING SUMMARY

- O OUR DEFENSES IN BAD SHAPE
- O MONEY ALONE WON'T CURE PROBLEM
- O THE PROBLEM IS CORRECTABLE, IF
 - WE RECOGNIZE REALITY
 - MAKE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN:
 - PEOPLE
 - STRATEGY AND TACTICS
 - HARDWARE

LET US SUMMARIZE WHAT THIS TALK IS ABOUT:

FIRST, OUR DEFENSES ARE IN BAD SHAPE--PROBABLY WORSE THAN THEY'VE BEEN AT ANY TIME SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE KOREAN WAR.

SECOND, MORE MONEY SPENT THE SAME WAY WE SPEND IT TODAY WON'T MAKE THE PROBLEM GO AWAY--AND IT MIGHT MAKE THE PROBLEM WORSE.

THIRD, THE PROBLEM OF DECLINING DEFENSE AT INCREASING COST CAN BE CURED IF:

- o WE ^{attack} UNDERSTAND THE DISEASE RATHER THAN THE SYMPTOMS; AND IF
- o WE MAKE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN THE THREE BUILDING BLOCKS OF A SUCCESSFUL MILITARY: PEOPLE, STRATEGY AND TACTICS, AND HARDWARE.

GOALS OF MILITARY REFORM

- O A MILITARY THAT CAN WIN
- O PRESERVE CONSENSUS IN FAVOR
OF A STRONG DEFENSE

IN OTHER WORDS

GETTING THE DEFENSE WE PAY FOR

AT THE OUTSET, IT IS NECESSARY TO BE CLEAR ABOUT WHERE WE ARE GOING. WE HAVE TWO SIMPLE GOALS:

ONE, WE WANT MILITARY FORCES THAT CAN WIN IF CALLED UPON.

TWO, WE WANT THE SUPPORT OF THE NATION FOR SUCH FORCES, NOT FOR ONE OR TWO YEARS, BUT FOR THE LONG HAUL--TO 1990 AND BEYOND.

WE THINK THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WON'T SUPPORT THE DEFENSE THE COUNTRY NEEDS UNLESS THEY ARE CONVINCED THEY'RE GETTING THEIR MONEY'S WORTH.

WHAT DOES IT TAKE TO WIN WARS

- O PEOPLE
- O STRATEGY AND TACTICS
- O HARDWARE

ON THE PEOPLE SIDE " BUSINESS AS USUAL" MEANS:

FIRST, PEOPLE AND ORGANIZATIONS ARE FORCED TO ADAPT TO THE HARDWARE
INSTEAD OF VICE VERSA.

SECOND, PEOPLE ARE NO LONGER LED. INSTEAD THEY ARE "MANAGED" BY ADMINSTRATORS
AND COMPUTERS THEY NEVER GET TO SEE.

THE CENTRALIZATION AND COMPUTERIZATION OF PERSONNEL "MANAGEMENT", IN
TURN, LEADS TO A DEHUMANIZING AND DEMORALIZING LEVEL OF PERSONNEL TURBULENCE
AND TURNOVER--HIGHER THAN THAT OF ANY OTHER MILITARY ORGANIZATION IN THE
WORLD.

NEXT, THE INCREASING DOMINANCE OF ADMINISTRATION AND PROCUREMENT MEANS
THAT FIELD TRAINING AND THE HONING OF COMBAT SKILLS ONLY GET THE TIME
AND RESOURCES THAT ARE LEFT OVER (WHICH IS NOT MUCH).

AND, OF COURSE, THE PROMOTION SYSTEM GENERALLY FAVORS PERSONNEL MANAGERS
OR PROCUREMENT MANAGERS OVER COMBAT LEADERS, TACTICIANS AND TRAINERS.

THE RESULT IS INEVITABLE: WE NOW HAVE LESS UNIT COHESION AND LESS ABILITY
TO ATTRACT AND RETAIN QUALIFIED PEOPLE THAN EVER BEFORE. AND MANY OF
THE PEOPLE WE LOSE TEND, UNFORTUNATELY, TO BE THE MOST COMBAT-ORIENTED--
THE VERY ONES WE MOST NEED IN WAR.

- Russia?

NEW APPROACHES

- O WE CAN NOT PRESENT A COMPLETE PROGRAM IN A SHORT BRIEFING
- O FOLLOWING SLIDES ARE EXAMPLES OF SPECIFIC REFORM IDEA

BASIS FOR NEW APPROACHES

PEOPLE

TACTICS AND STRATEGY

HARDWARE

NATURALLY, IN A SHORT TALK WE CANNOT PRESENT A COMPLETE REFORM PROGRAM. WE DO HAVE IN MIND A WIDE RANGE OF SPECIFIC AND CONSTRUCTIVE ALTERNATIVES TO "BUSINESS AS USUAL".

THE FUNDAMENTAL BASIS OF THESE REFORM ALTERNATIVES IS DERIVED FROM EXAMINING THE NATURE OF THE THREE ELEMENTS OF SUCCESSFUL FORCES: PEOPLE, STRATEGY AND TACTICS, AND HARDWARE.

IT IS CLEAR THAT PEOPLE AND HUMAN NATURE CHANGE VERY LITTLE OVER TIME. STRATEGY/TACTICS CHANGE MORE THAN HUMAN NATURE AND HARDWARE CHANGES EVEN MORE DRAMATICALLY OVER TIME THAN EITHER OF THE PRECEDING TWO. IN OTHER WORDS, HUMAN NATURE HAS A HIGH DEGREE OF CONSTANCY WHILE, AT THE OTHER EXTREME, HARDWARE HAS VERY LITTLE. WHAT DOES THIS IMPLY? IT MEANS WE MUST ACCEPT THE IDEA THERE CAN BE NO STABLE PLANNING IF WE START WITH HARDWARE AND TRY TO FORCE TACTICS AND STRATEGY AS WELL AS PEOPLE TO FIT THE VAGARIES OF HARDWARE CHANGES.

PUT BLUNTLY: WITHOUT STARTING WITH PEOPLE THERE CAN BE NO TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC THEMES FOR WINNING. ADDITIONALLY, IT BECOMES VERY LIKELY THAT THE HARDWARE WE DESIGN WILL IMPEDE RATHER THAN ENHANCE PEOPLE'S ABILITY TO SHAPE AND ADAPT TO CHANGE IN COMBAT.

NEW APPROACHES: PEOPLE

WE START WITH PEOPLE NOT HARDWARE,
BECAUSE PEOPLE ARE MORE IMPORTANT
THAN HARDWARE IN WINNING WARS

- O PROVIDE MORE \$S AND TIME FOR FIELD TRAINING IN 'NON-CANNED' EXERCISES
- O BUY SIMPLE EQUIPMENT TO PERMIT MORE ATTENTION TO TACTICS AND TRAINING RATHER THAN MAINTENANCE
- O ADOPT A REGIMENTAL TYPE SYSTEM FOR BETTER COHESION
- O PROMOTE MORE COMBAT LEADERS AND TACTICIANS

ALTHOUGH MOST OF THE DEFENSE DEBATE CENTERS AROUND HARDWARE AND MONEY, IN FACT THE MOST URGENTLY NEEDED REFORMS ARE IN THE PEOPLE AREA. WE'LL COVER FOUR EXAMPLES HERE.

TO BEGIN WITH WE NEED A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE--PERHAPS A DOUBLING--IN MONEY AND TIME FOR FIELD TRAINING, PARTICULARLY FOR THE TWO-SIDED, FREE-PLAY EXERCISES THAT ARE CRUCIAL TO DEVELOPING INITIATIVE AND NEW TACTICS. THIS MEANS INCREASING OPERATING BUDGET FOR MORE SHOOTING, MORE DRIVING, MORE STEAMING AND MORE FLYING.

COMPLEX, UNRELIABLE EQUIPMENT SHRINKS TRAINING TIME AND MAKES MAJOR INCREASES IN TRAINING UNAFFORDABLE. BUYING SIMPLER WEAPONS INHERENTLY PROVIDES MORE TRAINING TIME AND, EVEN MORE IMPORTANT, PERMITS MORE ATTENTION TO TACTICS INSTEAD OF MAINTENANCE.

TO ADDRESS THE CRIPPLING PROBLEM OF DETERIORATING UNIT COHESION, WE NEED TO BUILD BONDS AMONG OFFICERS AND THEIR MEN BY LEAVING THEM TOGETHER WITHOUT ROTATION FOR SEVERAL YEARS. THIS CAN ONLY BE DONE BY DECENTRALIZING THE POWER OF PERSONNEL SYSTEMS AND BY MOVING TOWARDS A REGIMENTAL-TYPE SYSTEM.

LAST AND MOST IMPORTANT, NO PEOPLE REFORMS WILL BE LASTING UNLESS WE CHANGE THE TYPE OF PEOPLE WE PROMOTE. MORALE, RETENTION, LOYALTY AND COHESION WILL NOT IMPROVE UNLESS WE PROMOTE MORE COMBAT LEADERS AND TACTICIANS RATHER THAN PROCUREMENT AND PERSONNEL MANAGERS.

NEW APPROACHES:
STRATEGY AND TACTICS

- O DECENTRALIZED COMMAND TO PERMIT FOCUS ON EXTERNAL COMBAT ENVIRONMENT
- O AD^cPT THE MANEUVER WARFARE APPROACH TO EXPLOIT THE UNCERTAINTY AND CHANGES OF COMBAT
- O ENCOURAGE TACTICAL EXPERIMENTATION TO CREATE DIVERSITY, NOT RIGIDITY, ON THE BATTLEFIELD

GAUGED

THE VALUE WE PLACE ON STRATEGY AND TACTICS CAN BE ~~GAGED~~ BY THE ABSENCE OF A SINGLE OFFICE IN THE PENTAGON CHARGED WITH THE MISSION OF STUDYING AND DEVELOPING EITHER STRATEGY OR TACTICS. THE CHANGES IN PROMOTION POLICY WE JUST DISCUSSED WILL CERTAINLY HELP, BUT CHANGES IN FUNDAMENTAL IDEAS ARE ALSO NECESSARY.

FIRST, WE NEED TO DECENTRALIZE OUR MASSIVE COMMAND SYSTEMS JUST TO GIVE COMMANDERS THE TIME TO FOCUS ON COMBAT AND THE ENEMY.

THIS, IN TURN, WILL PERMIT US TO SUBSTITUTE MANEUVER WARFARE IDEAS FOR OUR TRADITIONAL FIXATION ON FIREPOWER AND ATTRITION--AND WE NEED TO DO THIS AT ALL LEVELS FROM THE RIFLE SQUAD TO THE THEATER COMMAND. JUST THINK ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS ISSUE IN FACING THE RUSSIANS: ARE WE MORE LIKELY TO WIN BY FIREPOWER AND ATTRITION AGAINST A NATION THAT ACCEPTED 20 MILLION DEATHS IN WWII--OR DO WE HAVE A BETTER CHANCE USING MANEUVER TO EXPLOIT THE RIGIDITIES OF THE WORLD'S MOST CENTRALIZED SOCIETY?

AND, FINALLY, WE NEED TO ENCOURAGE TACTICAL IMAGINATION AND INITIATIVE, PARTICULARLY AMONG JUNIOR OFFICERS, BY PROVIDING THE OPPORTUNITY TO TRY AND TEST NEW IDEAS IN THE FIELD--AND WE NEED TO REWARD INNOVATIVE ATTEMPTS, EVEN WHEN THEY DON'T WORK.

NEW APPROACHES:
HARDWARE

- O SHAPE EQUIPMENT TO FIT THE STRESS AND UNCERTAINTIES OF ACTUAL COMBAT, RATHER THAN THE THEORIES OF LABORATORY TECHNOLOGY.
- O PURSUE BRILLIANTLY SIMPLIFYING TECHNOLOGY THAT EXPLOITS THE ENEMY'S VULNERABILITIES AND EXPANDS OUR TACTICAL OPPORTUNITIES.

WE ARE OFTEN TOLD THAT THE CENTRAL DEFENSE HARDWARE ISSUE IS THE DILEMMA OF "QUANTITY VERSUS QUALITY". THIS IS A DANGEROUSLY MISLEADING SLOGAN. WHY? IN MOST MAJOR WEAPONS, THE REAL CHOICE WE FACE IS BETWEEN A NEW, COMPLEX, UNRELIABLE, PONDEROUS AND INEFFECTIVE WEAPON SYSTEM AND A SIMPLE, SMALL, AGILE AND EFFECTIVE SYSTEM. IN OTHER WORDS, THE CHOICE IS ACTUALLY "INEFFECTIVE QUALITY VERSUS EFFECTIVE QUANTITY" AND THE DILEMMA IS THAT THE "BUSINESS AS USUAL" ESTABLISHMENT PREFERS THE "INEFFECTIVE QUALITY" SIDE.

HOW DO WE TURN THIS AROUND? FIRST, WE NEED TO INSIST ON EQUIPMENT THAT WILL RETAIN EFFECTIVENESS WHEN FACING THE STRESS, CHAOS, INSUFFICIENT TRAINING AND HASTY MAINTENANCE THAT INEVITABLY ACCOMPANY WAR. WEAPONS BASED ON THE IDEALIZED CONDITIONS OF COMBAT IMAGINED BY THE ADVOCATES OF COMPLEX TECHNOLOGY ARE LIKELY TO LET OUR SOLDIERS DOWN.

SECOND, WE NEED TO PURSUE BRILLIANTLY SIMPLE TECHNOLOGY THAT PERMITS NEW AND EXPANDED TACTICS RATHER THAN EMPHASIZING EVEN MORE COMPLEX TECHNOLOGY TO SUPPORT THE SAME OLD, RIGID TACTIC. CLASSIC EXAMPLES OF SUCH BRILLIANTLY SIMPLE ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY INCLUDE THE 30 MM DEPLETED URANIUM CANNON ROUND WHICH ALLOWS FIGHTER TO ACHIEVE UNPRECEDENTED LETHALITY AGAINST TANKS, AND THE REMARKABLY SIMPLE SIDEWINDER HEAT-SEEKING MISSILE, WHICH REMAINS TO THIS DAY THE ONLY AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE WITH REAL SUCCESS IN ACTUAL AIR COMBAT.

WHAT DOES THIS APPROACH IMPLY FOR ACTUAL TANKS, GUNS, SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT? WE ARE PREPARED TO ADDRESS EACH OF THESE AREAS IN SPECIFIC DETAIL, BUT THE GENERAL PICTURE IS CLEAR: WE SHOULD BE LOOKING FOR WEAPONS THAT

IMPLICATION

SELECT OR DEVELOP WEAPONS THAT ARE

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|--|
| ☐ SMALL | ☐ QUICK TO MOVE |
| ☐ HARD TO DETECT | ☐ QUICK TO KILL |
| ☐ RELIABLE | ☐ AFFORDABLE IN MASS |

ARE SMALL AND HARD-TO-FIND, RELIABLE AND EASY TO MAINTAIN IN COMBAT,
HIGHLY AGILE AND QUICK TO KILL, AND CHEAP ENOUGH THAT WE CAN AFFORD
LARGE NUMBERS. USING THESE IDEAS WE CAN SELECT OR DEVELOP HARDWARE THAT
IS, WEAPON FOR WEAPON, BETTER THAN THE SOVIETS' AND THAT SIMULTANEOUSLY
PERMITS US TO MATCH OR OUTPRODUCE THEM IN NUMBERS.

CAN WE WIN WARS AND
PRESERVE CONSENSUS?

YES!

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WE BELIEVE THAT, IF WE HAVE THE WILL TO FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGE THE WAY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROACHES PEOPLE, STRATEGY AND TACTICS, AND HARDWARE, THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT OUR MILITARY CAN WIN WARS AND MAINTAIN STRONG POPULAR SUPPORT FOR DEFENSE OVER THE LONG HAUL.

WE CAN REFORM.

WILL WE?

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IN HARDWARE, WHAT COUNTS IS HAVING A LOT OF IT AND MAKING SURE IT WORKS EFFECTIVELY IN COMBAT.

MORE SPECIFICALLY, THE HARDWARE NUMBERS THAT COUNT ARE THE NUMBERS OF WEAPONS ACTUALLY AVAILABLE TO ENGAGE THE ENEMY. WEAPONS IN THE HANGARS AND THE MAINTENANCE PITS ARE A LIABILITY, NOT AN ASSET.

SIMILARLY, THE HARDWARE EFFECTIVENESS THAT COUNTS IS NOT THE ENGINEERING EXCELLENCE ON THE R&D PROVING GROUND BUT THE EFFECTIVENESS ACHIEVED IN THE HANDS OF ORDINARY TROOPS FACING THE STRESS AND CHAOS OF COMBAT.

NEW HARDWARE, PARTICULARLY COMPLEX NEW HARDWARE, NEEDS TO BE EVALUATED IN TERMS OF ITS EFFECTS ON OUR PEOPLE AND OUR TACTICS. WE SHOULD NOT PURSUE TECHNOLOGY FOR ITS OWN SAKE. EFFECTIVE HARDWARE HELPS OUR SOLDIERS ADAPT TO CHANGE AND PERMITS THEM TO REACT AND MOVE FASTER THAN THE ENEMY. OPERATING UNSUITABLY COMPLEX HARDWARE OCCUPIES SO MUCH OF OUR SOLDIERS' ATTENTION THAT IT MAKES THEIR TACTICS RIGID AND THEIR REACTIONS SLOW AND PREDICTABLE--WHICH LEADS TO HIGH CASUALTIES AND FEW VICTORIES.

WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO U.S. MILITARY STRENGTH?

- O 30 YEARS MILITARY FAILURES
- O LACK OF COMBAT POWER
- O RESTRICTION OF TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC OPTIONS

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THE VERY EVIDENT DECLINE IN U.S. MILITARY STRENGTH--MEASURED IN PEOPLE, TACTICS AND STRATEGY, AND HARDWARE--IS THE REASON MILITARY REFORM IS SO URGENTLY NEEDED.


OUR LAST MAJOR MILITARY SUCCESS WAS THIRTY YEARS AGO: IT WAS THE BRILLIANT INCHON LANDING (WHICH WAS OPPOSED BY THE JCS).

THE DECLINE IN THE COMBAT SKILLS OF OUR SOLDIERS, SAILORS AND AIRMEN IS EVIDENT FROM TOP TO BOTTOM. EXAMPLES ABOUND: AN UNPRECEDENTED NUMBER OF COLONELS ARE REFUSING COMMAND POSITIONS; FIGHTER PILOT RETENTION IS AT NEARLY RECORD LOW; IT HAS BEEN YEARS SINCE THE U.S. WON A NATO TANK GUNNERY COMPETITION. NOT ALL OF THIS CAN BE BLAMED ON THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE. SOME OF IT IS DUE TO REPLACING COMBAT LEADERS WITH MANAGERS. SOME IS DUE TO EXCESSIVE EMPHASIS ON PROCUREMENT. MUCH IS DUE TO INSUFFICIENT TRAINING DUE TO THE COMPLEXITY AND EXPENSE OF THE WEAPONS WE HAVE SELECTED.


INEVITABLY, THIS SEVERELY RESTRICTS THE RANGE OF NEW TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC OPTIONS BEING TAUGHT OR ENVISIONED BY OUR MILITARY LEADERS. THIS, IN TURN, REINFORCED THE ATTRITION WARFARE, "BODY COUNT" MENTALITY OF VIETNAM AND THE FAILURES OF THE MAYAGUEZ, SON TAY, AND DESERT ONE RAIDS (EACH OF WHICH WAS PLANNED BY THE JCS).

THE NEXT CHARTS SHOW ANOTHER DIMENSION OF OUR MILITARY DECLINE: THE EROSION IN NUMBERS AND HARDWARE.


TANKS
PRODUCED



SURFACE
WARSHIPS



FIGHTERS
AND
INTERCEPTORS



NO MATTER WHETHER WE LOOK AT TANKS, SHIPS OR FIGHTERS, THE PICTURE IS THE SAME: A STEADY DECLINE IN NUMBERS EVER SINCE THE KOREAN WAR.

AND THIS DESPITE THE FACT THAT TODAY WE ARE SPENDING, IN CONSTANT DOLLARS, FAR MORE PER YEAR TO BUY TANKS, SHIPS AND FIGHTERS THAN WE DID IN THE MID FIFTIES.

HARDWARE

"I DON'T PRETEND TO HAVE THE ANSWER, BUT I THINK WE SHOULD REFLECT UPON THE DEMANDS THAT WE ARE MAKING OF TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRY-- INSTEAD OF 'FASTER,' 'HIGHER,' 'HEAVIER,' AND 'ABLE TO TAKE ON THE THREAT SINGLE-HANDEDLY, MAYBE WE SHOULD SAY, 'SIMPLER,' 'EASIER TO MAINTAIN' AND 'EASIER TO OPERATE,' MARINE CORPS COMMANDANT ROBERT H. BARROW

IS THERE AN ALTERNATIVE TO
'BUSINESS AS USUAL'?

THIS IS THE CRUCIAL QUESTION. IF THERE ARE NO ALTERNATIVES TO BUSINESS AS USUAL, WE MUST RESIGN OURSELVES TO INCREASING MILITARY WEAKNESS AND RAPIDLY ERODING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR DEFENSE.

THE NEXT SLIDES TRY TO EXPLORE THE NATURE OF "BUSINESS AS USUAL".

BUSINESS AS USUAL: HARDWARE

- O REPLACE EACH GENERATION WITH ONE 2 TO 5 TIMES MORE EXPENSIVE
- O PRETEND COMPLEX TECHNOLOGY CAN OUTWEIGH NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY
- O SACRIFICE TRAINING AND READINESS FOR PROCUREMENT OF INCREASINGLY COMPLEX EQUIPMENT
- O CREATE RIGIDITY BECAUSE OF LENGTH OF R&D CYCLE AND LACK OF DESIGN COMPETITION

"BUSINESS AS USUAL" MAKES HARDWARE THE FIRST PRIORITY. WHAT DO WE MEAN BY "BUSINESS AS USUAL" IN HARDWARE?

FIRST, WE REPLACE EACH GENERATION OF WEAPONS WITH ONE 2 TO 5 TIMES AS EXPENSIVE AND COMPLEX.

NEXT, WE CONVINCE OURSELVES THAT THE COMPLEXITY OF THE NEW HARDWARE SOMEHOW OVERCOMES THE INCREASING NUMERICAL INFERIORITY CREATED BY THE EXPENSIVE WEAPONS WE SELECT.

THEN, BECAUSE THE COMPLEX HARDWARE INEVITABLY GROWS IN COST, WE SHAVE MONEY FROM TRAINING AND READINESS TO PAY FOR OVERRUNS.

AND, OF COURSE, BECAUSE LARGE, COMPLEX SYSTEMS DICTATE FAR LONGER AND FAR FEWER R&D PROGRAMS, WE SUFFER FROM TECHNICAL RIGIDITY, FROM AN INADEQUATE RANGE OF TECHNICAL CHOICES AND FROM 10 TO 20 YEARS OF DELAY BEFORE THE TROOPS SEE THE NEW EQUIPMENT.

FURTHER, FEW OF THESE LARGE R&D PROGRAMS INVOLVE COMPETITIVE PROTOTYPE FLY-OFFS, SO WE SUFFER FROM ATROPHYING DESIGN TEAMS AND OVERLY COMPLEX, FLAWED DESIGNS--DUE TO THE LACK OF CONTINUOUS, RIGOROUS DESIGN COMPETITION.

BUSINESS AS USUAL:
STRATEGY AND TACTICS

- O INTERNAL BUREAUCRATIC DEMANDS -- NOT OUTSIDE WORLD --
SHAPE DECISIONS
- O LOW AGILITY
- O FIREPOWER/ATTRITION STYLE OF WARFARE

IN TACTICS AND STRATEGY, "BUSINESS AS USUAL" MEANS:

FIRST, OUR COMMANDERS HAVE ALMOST NO TIME TO SPEND ON THE OUTSIDE WORLD, THAT IS, NO TIME FOR STRATEGY OR TACTICS. WHY? BECAUSE MOST OF THEIR TIME AND ATTENTION IS CAPTURED BY THE INTERNAL PAPERWORK AND MAINTENANCE DEMANDS OF THE COMPLEX, CENTRALIZED, COMPUTERIZED COMMAND SYSTEMS WE CREATE.

THE SAME THING HAPPENS ON THE BATTLEFIELD. THERE OUR CENTRALIZED COMMAND STRUCTURES (AND COMPLEX, HEAVY WEAPONS) LEAD DIRECTLY TO LOW AGILITY, THAT IS, THE INABILITY TO REACT, SHIFT AND MOVE FASTER THAN THE ENEMY. AND, OF COURSE, CENTRALIZATION STIFLES THE INITIATIVE OF JUNIOR COMMANDERS, FURTHER IMPEDING OUR ABILITY TO REACT AND INNOVATE.

HAND-IN-HAND WITH PONDEROUS COMMAND SYSTEMS AND SLOW DECISION-MAKING GOES THE RELIANCE ON FIREPOWER, ATTRITION AND LINEAR DEFENSE--AFTER ALL, THESE ARE EASIER FOR LARGE BUREAUCRACIES TO DEFINE, REGULATE, QUANTIFY AND "MANAGE" THAN THE UNPREDICTABILITY, DECENTRALIZATION AND LIGHTNING RESPONSE REQUIRED BY MANEUVER WARFARE.

BUSINESS AS USUAL: PEOPLE

- O ADAPT PEOPLE TO HARDWARE
- O LET MANAGERS DOMINATE
- O MOVE PEOPLE CONSTANTLY TO SUIT
PERSONNEL SYSTEM
- O FIELD TRAINING GETS LOWEST PRIORITY

RESULT

- O POOR UNIT COHESION
- O UNPRECEDENTED RETENTION PROBLEM

TO WIN WARS TAKES THREE BASIC ELEMENTS. IN ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, THEY ARE:

- o PEOPLE, BECAUSE WARS ARE FOUGHT BY PEOPLE, NOT BY WEAPONS.
- o STRATEGY AND TACTICS BECAUSE WARS FOUGHT WITHOUT INNOVATIVE IDEAS BECOME UNWINNABLE BLOODBATHS.
- o HARDWARE, BECAUSE WEAPONS THAT DON'T WORK OR CAN'T BE BOUGHT IN ADEQUATE QUANTITY WILL BRING DOWN EVEN THE BEST PEOPLE AND THE BEST IDEAS.

PEOPLE

O QUALITY: FOR TALENT FOR COMBAT

O TRAINING: FOR CONFIDENCE, SKILL
AND IMAGINATION

O BUILDING BONDS: TO CREATE UNIT COHESION - *within units*
- *between military and society*

THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN WINNING IS TO HAVE SOLDIERS BETTER THAN THE ENEMY'S. HOW CAN WE GET AND KEEP BETTER SOLDIERS? BY:

- o ATTRACTING AND PROMOTING PEOPLE WHO HAVE THE CHARACTER, SKILL AND INITIATIVE TO SUCCEED IN COMBAT. (QUALITY IS NOT A SET OF SCORES ON A STANDARDIZED TEST.)
- o TRAINING TO HONE COMBAT SKILLS AND ALSO TO BUILD TACTICAL INITIATIVE AND IMAGINATION.
- o BUILDING THE PERSONAL BONDS NECESSARY FOR UNIT COHESION. COHESION KEEPS UNITS FROM CRUMBLING UNDER COMBAT STRESS.

STRATEGY AND TACTICS

- O THE NATURE OF CONFLICT
- O MANEUVER WARFARE INSTEAD OF
FIREPOWER ATTRITION

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OUR MILITARY NEEDS TO BE TRAINED IN INNOVATIVE TACTICS AND STRATEGIES THAT WILL LEAD TO QUICK, DECISIVE VICTORIES AT MINIMUM COST IN AMERICAN LIVES.

THIS REQUIRES, FIRST, AN UNDERSTANDING OF CONFLICT. CONFLICT CAN BE VIEWED AS REPEATED CYCLES OF OBSERVING-ORIENTING-DECIDING-ACTING BY BOTH SIDES (AND AT ALL LEVELS). THE ADVERSARY WHO MOVES THROUGH THIS CYCLE FASTEST GAINS AN INESTIMABLE ADVANTAGE BY DISRUPTING HIS ENEMY'S ABILITY TO RESPOND EFFECTIVELY.

THESE CYCLES CREATE CONTINUOUS AND UNPREDICTABLE CHANGE. OUR TACTICS AND STRATEGY NEED TO BE BASED ON THE IDEA OF ADAPTING TO, AND SHAPING, THIS CHANGE--AND DOING SO FASTER THAN THE ENEMY.

AS A RESULT, WE MUST SHIFT FROM OUR TRADITIONAL FIREPOWER/ATTRITION APPROACH TO A NEW EMPHASIS ON MANEUVER WARFARE. WHY? BECAUSE MANEUVER WARFARE EXPLOITS UNPREDICTABILITY AND CHANGE.

IN OTHER WORDS, WE WANT TO SUBSTITUTE SPEED FOR TONNAGE AND IDEAS FOR BLOOD.

GERMANS		ALLIES
TANKS	2,700	3,200
MEN	2,000,000	4,000,000
FIGHTERS	1,200	2,200

MANEUVER VS ATTRITION

A DRAMATIC EXAMPLE OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MANEUVER WARFARE AND THE FIREPOWER/ATTRITION APPROACH IS THE BATTLE FOR FRANCE IN 1940. THE ALLIES BELIEVED IN FIREPOWER AND ATTRITION. THEY TRIED A LINEAR, FIRE-POWER DEFENSE (INCLUDING THE FAMOUS MAGINOT LINE) STRETCHING FROM SWITZERLAND THROUGH BELGIUM.

THE GERMANS, WHO HAD SPENT THE THIRTIES REORGANIZING FOR MANEUVER WARFARE, ATTACKED WITH A SMALLER NUMBER OF MOSTLY INFERIOR TANKS--2700 VERSUS 3200 FOR THE ALLIES. THEY FEINTED ON THE RIGHT IN BELGIUM AND HOLLAND AND ATTACKED HEAVILY ON A NARROW FRONT MAINLY THROUGH THE ARDENNES FOREST. THEY EXPLOITED THEIR BREAKTHROUGH WITH STUNNING SPEED, WITH ONE ARMORED CORPS COVERING 230 MILES IN THE NEXT 14 DAYS. FRANCE, BELGIUM AND HOLLAND FELL IN 43 DAYS AT A COST TO THE GERMANS OF 27,000 KILLED, MUCH LESS THAN OUR LOSSES EACH YEAR IN VIETNAM.

wrong -
in 8 yrs
we lost ~
50000 men

THE BLITZKRIEG HAD INDEED MANAGED TO SUBSTITUTE IDEAS FOR BLOOD.

HARDWARE

- O PROVIDES NUMBERS IN COMBAT
- O IS EFFECTIVE IN COMBAT
- O HELPS TROOPS ADAPT TO CHANGES ON
THE BATTLEFIELD